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OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________ 
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 Adam Rosen asks us to reverse the District Court’s 
denial of his petition for habeas corpus.1 The Commonwealth 
of Pennsylvania requested a psychiatric exam of Rosen in 
preparation for his first murder trial, where he raised a 
diminished capacity defense. After his first conviction was 
overturned, he abandoned his diminished capacity defense. 
Rosen argues that the second trial court violated his Fifth 
Amendment right to remain silent when it ruled that his 
statements from the court-ordered psychiatric exam were 
admissible to impeach Rosen if he chose to testify at his second 
trial. After electing not to testify, Rosen was again convicted 
of murder. Because Rosen cannot demonstrate that using his 
statements to the Commonwealth’s psychiatric expert at the 
second trial for the limited purpose of impeachment would 
violate clearly established Fifth Amendment law, we will 
affirm the District Court’s dismissal. 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
A. Factual Background 
 
 On June 30, 2001, Adam Rosen stabbed his wife, Hollie 
Rosen, to death in their home.2 Thereafter, Rosen called the 
police and claimed that masked intruders had invaded his home 
and stabbed his wife.3 However, within several hours, he 
confessed to the stabbing but claimed it was an unintentional 
 
1 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 
2 Rosen v. Kerestes, Civil Action No. 15-4539, 2017 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 179378, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 25, 2017). 
3 Id.  
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response to his wife swinging a knife at him.4 According to 
Rosen, he and his wife had been arguing in the kitchen that 
morning when she nicked him on the neck and stomach with a 
knife.5 He claimed he followed her upstairs and then blacked 
out. The next thing he said he remembered was seeing his 
severely wounded wife on the bedroom floor. Hollie Rosen 
died of stab wounds to her back, neck, and chest.6 Adam Rosen 
was arrested and charged with first degree murder.7 
B. Rosen’s First and Second Murder Trials 
 At his first trial, Rosen presented a diminished capacity 
defense.8 In support of his defense, Rosen retained and was 
evaluated by psychiatrist Dr. Paul Fink.9 The trial court granted 
the Commonwealth’s motion to have Rosen evaluated by its 
own expert, Dr. Timothy Michals, in order to rebut the 
diminished capacity defense.10 The record does not show that 
he was Mirandized prior to this evaluation.11 Dr. Fink testified 
 
4 Id. at *2-3, *6; Rosen Br. 2.  
5 This version of events is based on Rosen’s statements to 
his psychiatric expert. A121-22. 
6 A122; see also Rosen, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179378, at 
*2. 
7 A69. 
8 Rosen, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179378, at *3. 
9 Id.  
10 Id.  
11 Rosen claims that Dr. Michals did not administer 
Miranda warnings before Rosen’s interview, and that he 
did not waive his right to remain silent. The 
Commonwealth, on the contrary, argues that Dr. Michals 
administered Miranda warnings and sought a waiver from 
Rosen before examining him. The Commonwealth bears 
the burden of establishing waiver and offers little to show 
that Rosen was indeed given a comprehensive set of 
warnings and thereafter knowingly and voluntarily waived 
his right to remain silent. See Commonwealth v. Rosen, 42 
A.3d 988, 1001 (Pa. 2012) (Saylor, J., dissenting) 
(explaining that the Commonwealth did not argue or brief 
warning-as-waiver issues below and therefore cannot rely 
on waiver as a basis for admitting Rosen’s statements to 
Dr. Michals); see also Gibbs v. Frank, 387 F.3d 268, 274 
(3d Cir. 2004) (explaining that a compelled psychiatric 
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at trial that Rosen was incapable of forming the intent to kill 
due to his manic-depressive mental illness, accompanied by 
psychotic features and paranoia, and the stress caused by the 
volatile deterioration of his marriage.12 Dr. Michals, on the 
other hand, testified that Rosen did not have a mental disorder 
that impaired his ability to form the specific intent to kill.13 Dr. 
Michals also testified that discrepancies between the 
statements Rosen made to the two psychiatric experts and 
Rosen’s changing version of events—including his initial false 
statement about the home invaders—demonstrated that Rosen 
was self-serving.14 Rosen did not testify in his own defense and 
the jury convicted him of first-degree murder.15 
 
 After Rosen was granted a new trial for reasons 
unrelated to this appeal, he abandoned his diminished capacity 
defense and notified the Commonwealth that he did not intend 
to call a mental health expert.16 This time, Rosen planned to 
testify in his defense and argue that he did not premeditate or 
have the deliberate, willful intent to kill his wife.17 
Nevertheless, the Commonwealth filed a motion in limine 
seeking to admit Rosen’s statements to Dr. Michals about 
killing his wife and those in which Rosen admitted he 
previously attempted to rape her.18 The trial court ruled that 
Rosen’s statements could not be used as substantive evidence 
in the Commonwealth’s case-in-chief, but that the 
Commonwealth could use the statements to impeach Rosen if 
 
interview implicates the Fifth Amendment and therefore 
the defendant-subject is entitled to Miranda warnings). 
Assuming arguendo that Rosen was not given Miranda 
warnings and did not waive his right to remain silent, 
Rosen still fails to establish that he is entitled to relief. 
12 Rosen, 42 A.3d at 990; A199-120.  
13 Rosen, 42 A.3d at 990.  
14 A150-51; see also Rosen Br. 4. 
15 A70; Rosen, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179378, at *3.  
16 Rosen, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179378, at *4.  
17 A191; Rosen Br. 7.  
18 A75. Rosen also submitted a motion in limine seeking to 
exclude the testimony, and the trial court held oral 
argument on the cross-motions. Rosen, 42 A.3d at 991. 
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he testified.19 After the trial court’s ruling, Rosen changed his 
mind and chose not to testify at the ensuing bench trial.20 At 
that trial, Rosen was convicted of first-degree murder and 
sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. 
 
C. Pennsylvania Supreme Court Ruling 
 
 After the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the 
conviction, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allocatur 
review on the question of “[w]hether the limited Fifth 
Amendment waiver occasioned by a mental health defense in 
a defendant’s first trial allows the Commonwealth to use the 
evidence obtained pursuant to such waiver as rebuttal in a 
subsequent trial where no mental health defense is 
presented.”21 Based upon several Pennsylvania state cases and 
Supreme Court law on the Fifth Amendment, the court 
affirmed the trial court’s ruling on the motion in limine. 
 
 In Commonwealth v. Morley, 681 A.2d 1254 (Pa. 1996), 
the court held that a defendant who raises a mental health 
defense in Pennsylvania waives the privilege against self-
incrimination under the Fifth Amendment and can be 
compelled to submit to an examination by the 
Commonwealth’s psychiatric expert. Likewise, in 
Commonwealth v. Sartin, 751 A.2d 1140 (Pa. 2000), the court 
held that a defendant who intends to use the results of his or 
her own psychiatric exam can be compelled to submit to 
examination by an expert of the Commonwealth’s choosing for 
the purpose of rebutting the defense.22  Reading Morley and 
Sartin together with Commonwealth v. Santiago23 and 
 
19 This oral ruling was not transcribed. Fortunately, the 
parties agree on the trial court’s ruling. Rosen, 2017 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 179378, at *14.  
20 Rosen, 42 A.3d at 991. 
21 Id. at 993.  
22 Sartin also made clear that the Fifth Amendment waiver 
only allowed the Commonwealth to use the results of its 
exam to rebut those issues implicated by the defense’s own 
expert. Sartin, 751 A.2d at 1143. 
23 Commonwealth v. Santiago, 662 A.2d 610 (Pa. 1995) 
(holding that a defendant who presents his own expert 
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Commonwealth v. Boyle,24 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
distilled the following rule: “[w]hen the defendant voluntarily 
presents a mental health defense that he subsequently 
abandons, the Commonwealth may, upon retrial, utilize the 
results of its psychological examination as to those issues that 
have been implicated by the defendant’s own expert.”25 The 
court explained that because the Commonwealth could 
introduce Dr. Fink’s testimony as substantive evidence, Dr. 
Michals’ testimony “clearly could have been utilized in 
response to those issues implicated by Dr. Fink’s testimony.”26  
 
 Finally, the court found that any error would have been 
harmless because, if Rosen had testified, “all of the 
impeachment evidence could have been elicited solely from 
Dr. Fink, who was in possession of the same mental health 
records and reports that Dr. Michals possessed.”27 Rosen 
“made admissions of guilt to both” experts and could have 
been impeached by the admissible statements he made to Dr. 
Fink.28 Therefore, “there is no reasonable possibility that the 
error may have contributed to the verdict.”29 
 
D. District Court’s Ruling on Habeas Review 
 Rosen filed a habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
2254, arguing that the trial court’s ruling that his statements to 
the Commonwealth’s psychiatric expert could be used to 
impeach him violated his Fifth Amendment right to remain 
 
psychiatric testimony at a first trial waives psychiatrist-
patient privilege with regard to his expert’s testimony at a 
second trial where he no longer raises an insanity defense). 
24 Commonwealth v. Boyle, 447 A.2d 250 (Pa. 1982) 
(admitting defendant’s testimony from his first trial at a 
subsequent trial where the defendant did not testify does 
not violate the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent 
because the constitutional privilege is waived). 
25 Rosen, 42 A.3d at 997. 
26 Id.  
27 Id.  
28 Id.  
29 Id. at 998. 
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silent.30 The District Court denied the petition, explaining that 
Rosen failed to show that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s 
conclusion that there was no Fifth Amendment violation ran 
afoul of clearly established federal law.31 The court explained 
that Rosen “relies on snippets from several Supreme Court 
cases and a Third Circuit case, in an attempt to extrapolate 
‘clearly established Federal law’ from general principles and 
materially distinguishable holdings of the Supreme Court.”32 
Thus, the District Court concluded that Rosen had failed to 
overcome the deference owed to state court decisions under the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
(AEDPA).33  
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A. Jurisdiction 
 Rosen brought this habeas corpus action under 28 
U.S.C. § 2254. The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. §§ 2241(a) and 2254(a). The order of the District Court 
dismissing the petition is an appealable final order. The District 
Court denied a certificate of appealability, but we later granted 
one on Rosen’s claimed Fifth Amendment violation.34 
Jurisdiction for this appeal arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 
28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). 
 
B. Standard of Review under AEDPA  
 We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s 
denial of Rosen’s habeas petition.35 The Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court decided the Fifth Amendment issue on the 
merits. Therefore, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), AEDPA 
requires Rosen to show that the state court ruling: 
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or 
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 
 
30 Rosen v. Kerestes, Civil Action No. 15-4539, 2018 WL 
4030740 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 2018).  
31 Id. at *1 n.1. 
32 Id. 
33 Id.  
34 A3.  
35 Ross v. Dist. Atty. Allegheny Cnty., 672 F.3d 198, 205 
(3d Cir. 2012).  
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established Federal law, as determined by the 
Supreme Court of the United States; or 
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an 
unreasonable determination of the facts in light 
of the evidence presented in the State court 
proceeding.36  
 In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000), the 
Supreme Court elaborated on § 2254(d)(1), explaining:  
Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal habeas 
court may grant the writ if the state court arrives 
at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this 
Court on a question of law or if the state court 
decides a case differently than this Court has on 
a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under 
the “unreasonable application” clause, a federal 
habeas court may grant the writ if the state court 
identifies the correct governing legal principle 
from this Court's decisions but unreasonably 
applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's 
case.37  
 We have further explained that a state court decision is 
“contrary to” clearly established law where “the Supreme 
Court has established a rule that determines the outcome of the 
petition.”38 “[I]t is not sufficient for the petitioner to show 
merely that his interpretation of Supreme Court precedent is 
more plausible than the state court’s; rather, the petitioner must 
demonstrate that Supreme Court precedent requires the 
contrary outcome.”39  
 
 A state court’s decision is an “unreasonable 
application” of clearly established law where “evaluated 
objectively and on the merits, [it] resulted in an outcome that 
cannot reasonably be justified under existing Supreme Court 
precedent. In making this determination, mere disagreement 
with the state court's conclusions is not enough to warrant 
 
36 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 
37 Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). 
38 Matteo v. Superintendent, SCI Albion, 171 F.3d 877, 888 
(3d Cir. 1999) (en banc), cert. denied 528 U.S. 824 (1999).  
39 Id. (emphasis in the original).  
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habeas relief.”40 Importantly, this entails a “substantially 
higher threshold” than a federal court’s independent judgment 
that the state court’s application of Supreme Court precedent 
was incorrect.41 Instead, the state court’s application of federal 
law must be objectively unreasonable, not merely incorrect.42 
 
 Section 2254(d)(2), in turn, sharply restricts the 
circumstances in which a federal habeas court may grant relief 
based on a state court’s factual determinations. The petitioner 
must show that the state court verdict was based on an 
unreasonable determination of the evidence and that a 
reasonable factfinder could not have reached the same 
conclusion.43  
III. DISCUSSION  
A. Rosen failed to demonstrate that using his 
statements to the Commonwealth’s psychiatric 
expert to impeach him at his second trial would be 
contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly 
established Fifth Amendment law. 
 We have previously described our approach to § 
2254(d)(1) as a two-step analysis whereby “federal habeas 
courts first . . . identify whether the Supreme Court has 
articulated a rule specific enough to trigger ‘contrary to’ 
review; and second, only if it has not, . . . evaluate whether the 
state court unreasonably applied the relevant body of 
precedent.”44 The plain language of § 2254(d)(1) applies to “a 
decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 
application of, clearly established Federal law”—applying the 
latter to both the “contrary to” and “unreasonable application” 
prongs of § 2254(d)(1).45 As we acknowledged in Matteo, there 
 
40 Id. at 890.  
41 Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (citing Schriro 
v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007)). 
42  Williams, 529 U.S. at 410 
(“[A]n unreasonable application of federal law is different 
from an incorrect application of federal law.”) (emphasis 
in the original).  
43 Campbell v. Vaughn, 209 F.3d 280, 291 (3d Cir. 2000). 
44 Matteo, 171 F.3d at 888.  
45 See Williams, 529 U.S. at 412 (“Under § 2254(d)(1), the 
writ may issue only if one of the following two conditions 
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is likely some overlap amongst the parts of § 2254(d)(1), “but 
we must attempt to read the statute so that each has some 
operative effect . . . .”46  
 
 Accordingly, identifying an applicable principle of 
clearly established Supreme Court law can be treated as a 
prerequisite—or Step 0.5—to applying the two-step test from 
Matteo. This approach is consistent with our decision in 
Fischetti v. Johnson, where we explained that § 2254(d)(1) 
“requires us to determine what the clearly established Supreme 
Court decisional law was at the time petitioner’s conviction 
became final[,]” and then “analyze the challenged state 
decision in light of that decisional law under each of the two 
prongs of the AEDPA test.”47  
 
 “Clearly established” Supreme Court law “refers to the 
holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court’s 
decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.”48 
Furthermore, in determining what is “clearly established,” 
Supreme Court decisions cannot be viewed “at a broad level of 
generality,” but instead must be viewed on a “case-specific 
level.”49 The “clearly established Federal law” provision 
requires Supreme Court decisions to be viewed through a 
“sharply focused lens.”50  
 
is satisfied—the state-court adjudication resulted in a 
decision that (1) ‘was contrary to . . . clearly established 
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the 
United States,’ or (2) ‘involved an unreasonable 
application of . . . clearly established Federal law, as 
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.’”). 
While Matteo was decided before Williams, we have since 
affirmed that the analytical framework from Matteo 
remains applicable. See Werts v. Vaughn, 228 F.3d 178, 
197 (3d Cir. 2000). 
46 Matteo, 171 F.3d at 888; see also Lindh v. Murphy, 521 
U.S. 320, 336 (1997) (“[I]n a world of silk purses and pigs’ 
ears, [AEDPA] is not a silk purse of the art of statutory 
drafting.”). 
47 Fischetti v. Johnson, 384 F.3d 140, 148 (3d Cir. 2004). 
48 Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. 
49 Fischetti, 384 F.3d at 148.  
50 Id. at 149. 
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 1. Clearly Established Supreme Court Law on the Fifth 
Amendment 
 Rosen claims that it is clearly established federal law 
that impeaching a defendant using evidence from the 
government’s mental health expert after a mental health 
defense is abandoned violates the Fifth Amendment. Rosen 
draws this proposed principle primarily from three Supreme 
Court cases: Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981); Buchanan 
v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402 (1987); and Kansas v. Cheever, 571 
U.S. 87 (2013). Rosen further relies on our decision in Gibbs 
v. Frank, 387 F.3d 268 (3d Cir. 2004), although he concedes 
that Gibbs is not clearly established Supreme Court law.51   
 Rosen primarily relies upon Estelle v. Smith. There, the 
Supreme Court held that a “criminal defendant, who neither 
initiates a psychiatric evaluation nor attempts to introduce any 
psychiatric evidence, may not be compelled to respond to a 
psychiatrist if his statements can be used against him at a 
capital sentencing proceeding.”52 The trial judge had sua 
sponte ordered an evaluation to determine the defendant’s 
competency to stand trial.53 The prosecution later used 
statements from that exam in a capital sentencing proceeding 
as evidence of the defendant’s future dangerousness.54 The 
defendant was sentenced to death.55 On appeal, the Supreme 
Court reversed the sentence. It held that the Fifth Amendment 
precluded the use of the defendant’s compelled statements 
 
51 The state court judgment must not merely be contrary to 
law as articulated by any federal court; rather “[i]t must 
contradict ‘clearly established’ decisions of the United 
States Supreme Court alone.” Fischetti, 384 F.3d at 147. 
However, “[i]n determining whether a state decision is an 
unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent, this 
court has taken the view that decisions of federal courts 
below the level of the . . . Supreme Court may be helpful . . 
. in ascertaining the reasonableness of state courts’ 
application of clearly established . . . Supreme Court 
precedent.” Id. at 149 (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted). 
52 Estelle, 451 U.S. at 468.  
53 Id. at 456-57. 
54 Id. at 459-60. 
55 Id. at 460. 
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against him at the penalty phase where he introduced no 
psychiatric evidence in his defense.56 The Court emphasized 
the compelled nature of the defendant’s statements, which 
were given in custody, pursuant to a court order, without 
counsel present, and in the absence of Miranda warnings.57 
Because the defendant was compelled to submit to the 
evaluation and had not attempted to introduce any psychiatric 
evidence of his own, the statements were inadmissible unless 
the psychiatrist apprised the defendant of his rights and 
obtained a valid waiver before questioning him.58 
 
 Rosen also relies on Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 
402 (1987). In Buchanan, the defendant raised an extreme 
emotional disturbance defense at his murder trial and called his 
former social worker to testify in his defense.59 The prosecutor 
cross-examined the social worker using the report from a court-
ordered exam that defense counsel and the prosecutor had 
jointly requested for the purpose of seeking mental health 
treatment for the defendant.60 The Supreme Court found no 
Fifth Amendment violation, explaining that “if a defendant 
requests such an evaluation or presents psychiatric evidence, 
then, at the very least, the prosecution may rebut this 
presentation with evidence from the reports of the examination 
that the defendant requested.”61 The Court distinguished 
Estelle because defense counsel here had jointly requested the 
exam and the defendant had placed his own mental health at 
issue.62 The Court concluded that “[t]he introduction of such a 
report for this limited rebuttal purpose does not constitute a 
Fifth Amendment violation.”63   
 
 
56 Id. at 468. 
57 Id. at 468-69. 
58 Id. As we have noted, we will assume arguendo that 
Rosen likewise was not apprised of his rights and did not 
waive his right to remain silent before his psychiatric 
exam. 
59 Buchanan, 483 U.S. at 408-09.  
60 Id. at 409-11. 
61 Id. at 422-23. 
62 Id. at 423. 
63 Id. at 423-24. 
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 The Supreme Court in Kansas v. Cheever, 571 U.S. 87 
(2013), applying Buchanan, found that the Fifth Amendment 
allowed the prosecution to introduce statements from a 
compelled mental health evaluation to rebut a mental health 
defense.64 At his murder trial, the defendant in Cheever offered 
a psychiatric expert to support his defense that voluntary 
intoxication had rendered him incapable of premeditation.65 
The state offered rebuttal testimony from the defendant’s 
court-ordered psychiatric examination.66 The Supreme Court 
held: “where a defense expert who has examined the defendant 
testifies that the defendant lacked the requisite mental state to 
commit a crime, the prosecution may offer evidence from a 
court-ordered psychological examination for the limited 
purpose of rebutting the defendant’s evidence.”67 The Court 
explained that once a defendant presents expert psychological 
evidence, the government cannot be denied “the only effective 
means of challenging that evidence: testimony from an expert 
who has also examined him.”68 The Court emphasized that the 
compelled testimony was used “only after” the defendant 
placed his mental health at issue and for the purpose of 
rebutting the mental health defense.69 
 
 Although our decision in Gibbs is not Supreme Court 
law, it is the most factually analogous case to Rosen’s and 
assists our inquiry into what is “clearly established” Fifth 
Amendment law in this court.70 There, Gibbs raised a mental 
 
64 Cheever, 571 U.S. at 93-95. 
65 Id. at 91. 
66 Id. at 91-92. 
67 Id. at 98. 
68 Id. at 94. 
69 Id. at 95. 
70 Fischetti, 384 F.3d at 149 (“In determining whether a 
state decision is an unreasonable application of Supreme 
Court precedent . . . decisions of federal courts below the 
level of the . . . Supreme Court may be helpful . . . in 
ascertaining the reasonableness of state courts’ application 
of clearly established . . . Supreme Court precedent.”) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). And while 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is not bound by Gibbs, it 
is a binding precedent in the District Court with respect to 
14 
 
infirmity defense at his first murder trial.71 The 
Commonwealth’s expert, Dr. Sadoff, testified at the first trial 
to rebut Gibbs’ expert testimony on diminished capacity.72 
That testimony introduced several inculpatory statements 
Gibbs made during the court-ordered exam.73 After his 
conviction was overturned on other grounds, Gibbs decided not 
to raise a mental health defense at his second trial. Instead, he 
contested the identity of the shooter.74 Nevertheless, the trial 
court allowed Sadoff to testify during the Commonwealth’s 
case-in-chief.75 That testimony included Gibbs’ inculpatory 
statements to Sadoff during his psychiatric interview.76 On 
habeas review, we found that the trial court’s decision, as 
affirmed by the Pennsylvania Superior Court, was an 
unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court 
law and granted Gibbs’ habeas petition.77 Importantly, we 
granted the petition based on the limited scope of the Miranda 
warnings given to Gibbs, which misstated the consequences of 
his Fifth Amendment waiver—an issue not relevant to Rosen’s 
appeal.78 However, we also stated that if Gibbs had not been 
Mirandized at all—as Rosen claims he was not—“the state 
ruling admitting the Gibbs interview in the second trial [would 
be] contrary to [Estelle v.] Smith itself.”79 In justifying this 
conclusion, we explained that “Sadoff was permitted to testify 
in the prosecution case in chief… simply to repeat 
incriminating statements that Gibbs had made.”80 This was 
problematic because those statements were offered “simply for 
the truth of the admissions of fact” and “not even to prove a 
psychological point, since the second trial presented no 
psychological issue before Sadoff testified.”81 
 
what constitutes an unreasonable application of Fifth 
Amendment law on habeas review. 
71 Gibbs, 387 F.3d at 271. 
72 Id. 
73 Id.  
74 Id.  
75 Id.  
76 Id.  
77 Id. at 277. 
78 Id. at 276.  
79 Id. at 275. 
80 Id. 
81 Id.  
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2. Application of Clearly Established Law to Rosen 
 Having reviewed the relevant Supreme Court law 
through “a sharply focused lens[,]” we cannot conclude that 
there is a directly applicable Supreme Court precedent that 
would preclude the Commonwealth from using Rosen’s 
statements against him at his second trial for the limited 
purpose of impeachment.82 Rosen attempts to extrapolate a 
principle of Fifth Amendment law from the similar yet 
materially distinguishable cases we have just discussed.83 
However, AEDPA’s deferential standard of review demands 
more than this jigsaw approach. We therefore cannot find that 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision was either 
“contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, 
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 
Court . . . .”84  
 
 The rule from Estelle—that a “criminal defendant, who 
neither initiates a psychiatric evaluation nor attempts to 
introduce any psychiatric evidence, may not be compelled to 
respond to a psychiatrist if his statements can be used against 
him at a capital sentencing proceeding”—is far too narrow to 
help Rosen here.85 Rosen both initiated an evaluation and 
introduced psychiatric evidence at his first criminal trial. It is 
undisputed that the Commonwealth could compel Rosen to be 
examined by its own expert for the purposes of preparing a 
rebuttal in the first trial.86 The Estelle Court expressly 
 
82 Fischetti, 384 F.3d at 149.   
83 We reiterate that cases Rosen relies upon are materially 
distinguishable, such that we can identify discrete issues 
the Supreme Court has not yet addressed. It would not be 
enough to point to irrelevant or meaningless differences. 
See Matteo, 171 F.3d at 888 (emphasizing that the 
petitioner is not required “to cite factually identical 
Supreme Court precedent”). The bar for relief under 
AEDPA is high but must not be insurmountable lest we 
effectively close the door to all relief on habeas. AEDPA 
requires that we defer, not that we abdicate. 
84 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 
85 Estelle, 451 U.S. at 468.  
86 A529 (“Federal courts have consistently reiterated . . . 
that when a defendant places his mental status at issue, his 
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acknowledged that “a different situation arises where a 
defendant intends to introduce psychiatric evidence” and 
expressed concern about the government’s ability to rebut such 
evidence.87 Viewed through a “sharply focused lens,” Estelle 
speaks only to the Fifth Amendment rights of someone who 
never raises a mental health defense and not to the scope of the 
Fifth Amendment waiver for someone, like Rosen, who raises 
and presents an unsuccessful mental health defense that he later 
abandons.88 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court could thus rely 
on Commonwealth v. Boyle to find that the Fifth Amendment 
waiver triggered by Rosen’s mental health defense at his first 
trial extended to his second trial, at least with respect to the 
issues raised by his own expert.89 
 
 Buchanan is even less helpful to Rosen. There, the 
defense had joined in the request for the psychiatric evaluation 
and therefore the defendant’s statements did not result from an 
involuntary examination. Rosen stresses the phrase “limited 
 
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is 
not violated by a court-ordered psychiatric examination.”); 
see also Rosen, 42 A.3d at 996-97 (discussing Morley and 
Sartin). 
87 Estelle, 451 U.S. at 472; see also id. at 465 (“When a 
defendant asserts the insanity defense and introduces 
supporting psychiatric testimony, his silence may deprive 
the State of the only effective means it has of controverting 
his proof on an issue that he interjected into the case.”). 
88 Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 795 (2001) (noting that 
the Supreme Court has “never extended Estelle's Fifth 
Amendment holding beyond its particular facts”). 
89 447 A.2d 250 (Pa. 1982). In Boyle, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court held that a defendant who testifies at his 
first trial waives his Fifth Amendment privilege and cannot 
reclaim it at a later trial on the same indictment, even 
where he declines to testify. Id. at 256. Without endorsing 
this decision or its application to Rosen, we merely note 
that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court could reasonably, 
even if incorrectly, determine that Rosen waived his Fifth 
Amendment privilege at his first trial by introducing expert 
psychiatric testimony regarding his mental health, and that 
this waiver transferred to his second trial despite the 
abandonment of his mental health defense.   
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rebuttal purpose” to conclude that “[t]he Buchanan [c]ourt 
could avoid the Fifth Amendment problem only because of this 
limitation on the use of such evidence.”90 Rosen therefore 
proposes that Buchanan “clearly establishes” that psychiatric 
evidence is only admissible to rebut the defendant’s mental 
health defense. This inference is not supported by either the 
text or reasoning of Buchanan. The Court explicitly stated that 
the psychiatric evidence there was admissible “at the very 
least” to rebut a mental health defense. The Court’s focus was 
on the voluntary nature of the examination jointly requested by 
the defense.91 Buchanan leaves open the scope of a Fifth 
Amendment waiver triggered by a defendant’s mental health 
defense. For example, Buchanan does not address what would 
happen if the defense was raised and later abandoned, or 
whether the waiver applies to involuntary examinations 
compelled by the government.  
 
 The most compelling Supreme Court support for 
Rosen’s proposed principle of Fifth Amendment law comes 
from Cheever. The reasoning in Cheever focuses on the 
defendant placing his mental health at issue through his own 
evidence, and the right of the prosecution to rebut such 
evidence. The Supreme Court referred several times to the 
evidence being admissible for the “limited purpose of 
rebutting” the defense’s mental health defense. Citing to 
Buchanan, the Court explained that it previously “held that 
testimony based on a court-ordered psychiatric evaluation is 
admissible only for a ‘limited rebuttal purpose.’”92  
 
 According to Rosen, Cheever established that 
compelled testimony from the government’s psychiatric expert 
is only admissible to the extent it directly rebuts psychiatric 
 
90 Rosen Br. 27. 
91 Buchanan, 483 U.S. at 422; see also id. at 424 (“Here, in 
contrast [to Estelle], petitioner's counsel himself requested 
the psychiatric evaluation . . . .”). 
92 Cheever, 571 U.S. at 97; see also id. at 93-94 (“The rule 
of Buchanan, which we reaffirm today, is that where a 
defense expert who has examined the defendant testifies 
that the defendant lacked the requisite mental state to 
commit an offense, the prosecution may present 
psychiatric evidence in rebuttal.”). 
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evidence presented by the defendant. Yet, even this narrow 
reading of Cheever does not touch on several vital aspects of 
Rosen’s case. Therefore, we cannot conclude that it clearly 
established an applicable precedent. Cheever, for example, 
does not address whether impeaching the defendant with 
statements from the compelled exam, if he chose to testify, 
would constitute a proper “rebuttal purpose.” In fact, Cheever 
alluded to limitations on the Fifth Amendment protections for 
testifying defendants.93 The Court further explained that 
precluding the use of compelled psychiatric testimony “would 
undermine the adversarial process, allowing a defendant to 
provide the jury, through an expert operating as proxy, with a 
one-sided and potentially inaccurate view of his mental state at 
the time of the alleged crime.”94 These concerns about the 
integrity of the judicial process and fairness to the government 
undermine Rosen’s claim that he should have been allowed to 
testify at his second trial without impeachment by his own 
prior inconsistent statements. Nor does Cheever touch on 
whether the proper admission of testimony for a “limited 
rebuttal purpose” at one trial constitutes a Fifth Amendment 
waiver in future proceedings where the mental health defense 
is abandoned.95  
 
 Given the limitations of AEDPA, the absence of 
Supreme Court precedent addressing the use of compelled 
statements given to the government’s mental health expert as 
impeachment evidence is fatal to Rosen’s claim here. As we 
have noted, the second trial court ruled that Rosen’s compelled 
statements were inadmissible as substantive evidence and 
admissible only for the limited purpose of impeachment in the 
event Rosen testified. Estelle, Buchanan, and Cheever address 
situations where the government sought to admit the 
 
93 Id. at 94 (“The admission of this rebuttal testimony 
harmonizes with the principle that when a defendant 
chooses to testify in a criminal case, the Fifth Amendment 
does not allow him to refuse to answer related questions on 
cross-examination.”).  
94 Id.  
95 See Boyle, 447 A.2d at 256 (acknowledging that a 
defendant who testifies in one trial and thus waives his 
Fifth Amendment privilege cannot object to the admission 
of testimony at a later trial even where he does not testify). 
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defendant’s statements to prove or disprove a contested 
issue—such as the defendant’s future dangerousness, intent, or 
mental state. However, there was no indication in any of these 
cases that the defendant intended to testify and was precluded 
from doing so by the prospect of impeachment by compelled 
statements.96 Therefore they do not address the admissibility of 
a defendant’s statements for the purpose of impeaching the 
defendant.  
 
 Even Gibbs, with its otherwise striking factual 
similarity to Rosen’s circumstances, is distinguishable on this 
point. The testimony of the Commonwealth’s expert in Gibbs 
was introduced “in the prosecution [case-in-chief]. . . simply to 
repeat incriminating statements” made by the defendant and 
offered  “simply for the truth” of the matters asserted.97 In 
contrast, Rosen’s second trial court specifically found that Dr. 
Michals’ testimony was inadmissible in the case-in-chief and 
would be allowed solely for the purpose of impeachment if 
Rosen chose to testify. Impeachment evidence is not offered to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted, but rather is offered to 
 
96 Because we deny Rosen’s petition on other grounds, we 
do not reach the issue of whether the state court’s ruling on 
the motion in limine effectively denied Rosen his right to 
testify, or whether he forfeited his right to appeal the Fifth 
Amendment issue by electing not to testify. Compare Luce 
v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41-43 (1984) (holding that a 
defendant failed to preserve an issue for appeal where the 
trial court ruled that he could be impeached with a prior 
conviction under Fed. R. Evid. 609(a) and he thereafter 
declined to testify), with New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 
450, 454 (rejecting state’s claim that defendant’s Fifth 
Amendment challenge to the trial court’s ruling that his 
immunized testimony could be used as impeachment 
evidence is too “abstract and hypothetical” to review 
because defendant did not take the stand); and Brooks v. 
Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 612 (1972) (reviewing a state 
statute requiring a testifying defendant to testify first at his 
trial, despite the petitioner choosing not to testify because 
of the statute, and finding it violates the Fifth 
Amendment). 
97 Gibbs, 387 F.3d at 275. 
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impugn the credibility of the person testifying.98 Moreover, the 
jury can be specifically instructed that impeachment evidence 
may be considered only for that limited purpose and cannot be 
considered as substantive evidence of the defendant’s mental 
state or intent.99  
 
 The trial court’s ruling that Rosen’s statements could be 
used only for impeachment is a material distinction on habeas 
review under AEDPA. There is reason to believe that the 
Supreme Court might treat impeachment by compelled 
statements differently than the admission of such testimony as 
substantive evidence in Rosen’s situation. In Harris v. New 
York, the Supreme Court held that statements obtained in 
violation of the Fifth Amendment under Miranda are still 
admissible for the purposes of impeachment, even though such 
statements are inadmissible as substantive evidence.100 The 
Supreme Court explained that the right of the defendant to 
testify “cannot be construed to include the right to commit 
perjury[,]” and therefore “[h]aving voluntarily taken the stand, 
[the defendant] was under an obligation to speak truthfully and 
accurately, and the prosecution . . . did no more than utilize the 
traditional truth-testing device[]” of impeachment by the 
defendant’s own inconsistent statements.101 On the other hand, 
 
98 Impeachment evidence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
(11th ed. 2019) (“Evidence used to undermine a witness’s 
credibility.”). 
99 Because Rosen elected a bench trial and chose not to 
testify, such an instruction was not necessary here. 
However, the possibility of giving such an instruction in a 
similar case is relevant to distinguishing between the use of 
evidence for substantive versus impeachment purposes. In 
addition, a judge at a bench trial would understand that she 
could not consider impeachment evidence for any purpose 
other than assessing a witness’s credibility.  
100 Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971) (“The 
shield provided by [Miranda] cannot be perverted into a 
license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the 
risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.”). 
101 Id. at 225; see also United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 
620, 626 (1980) (explaining that “the deterrent function of 
the rules excluding unconstitutionally obtained evidence is 
sufficiently served by denying its use to the government on 
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coerced statements—such as where “the [speaker] is told to 
talk or face the government’s coercive sanctions[]”—are 
deemed involuntary and therefore inadmissible for any 
purpose, including impeachment.102  
 
 A court-ordered psychological or psychiatric exam, like 
a custodial police interrogation, is an inherently coercive 
situation. To the extent the District Court concluded that 
Rosen’s “statements to Dr. Michals cannot be deemed 
involuntary, coerced, or compelled since he voluntarily raised 
the mental health defense[,]” we cannot agree.103 Rosen’s 
statements, given while in custody, under court order, without 
the benefit of Miranda warnings, are compelled testimony 
under the Fifth Amendment.104 Nevertheless, whether 
 
its direct case” and therefore allowing the government to 
impeach a testifying defendant using evidence 
inadmissible in the case-in-chief). 
102 Portash, 440 U.S. at 459 (holding that testimony given 
in response to a grant of legislative immunity is “coerced 
testimony” because the person must testify or potentially 
face contempt charges, and under such circumstances 
“there is no question whether physical or psychological 
pressures overrode the defendant’s will”); see also Kansas 
v. Ventris, 556 U.S. 586, 590 (2009) (“The Fifth 
Amendment guarantees that no person shall be compelled 
to give evidence against himself, and so is violated 
whenever a truly coerced confession is introduced at trial, 
whether by way of impeachment or otherwise.”); Mincey v. 
Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398-402 (1978) (holding that a 
statement taken from a defendant while he was 
hospitalized and in intensive care, slipping in and out of 
consciousness, and in “unbearable” pain was inadmissible, 
even for impeachment, because the statement was not “the 
product of his free and rational choice”).  
103 Rosen, 2018 WL 4030740, at *1 n.1. 
104 Estelle, 451 U.S. at 467, 469 (“The considerations 
calling for the accused to be warned prior to custodial 
interrogation apply with no less force to the pretrial 
psychiatric examination” because an examination “while in 
custody with a court-ordered psychiatric” expert is “not 
given freely and voluntarily without any compelling 
influences.”) (internal quotation marks and citation 
22 
 
testimony given to a psychiatrist under court order is “truly 
coerced” and therefore involuntary, or merely compelled in the 
same sense as a statement given to police in violation of 
Miranda (and therefore still admissible for impeachment), is 
yet to be determined by the Supreme Court.105  
 
 Nor do we decide today whether Rosen’s statements 
were voluntary or involuntary under the Fifth Amendment. 
Rather, we merely conclude that the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court’s decision approving of the trial court’s admissibility 
ruling is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of an 
ambiguous area of Fifth Amendment law.106 This is not to say 
that Rosen’s interpretation of the Fifth Amendment is not 
plausible, or even compelling.107 However, such a rule is not 
 
omitted); see also Gibbs, 387 F.3d at 274 (affirming that 
Miranda warnings apply to court-compelled psychiatric 
interviews). And unlike in the Miranda context, the only 
way Rosen could remain silent was to forfeit his mental 
health defense at trial. See Morley, 681 A.2d at 1258, 1258 
n.5 (holding that a defendant who raises a mental infirmity 
defense “may not refuse to allow the Commonwealth 
psychiatrist to examine him or her on the basis that it 
violates the defendant’s privilege against self-
incrimination” and “may be compelled to submit to a 
psychiatric exam”). 
105 Compare Ventris, 556 U.S. at 590 (“The Fifth 
Amendment . . . is violated whenever a truly coerced 
confession is introduced at trial, whether by way of 
impeachment or otherwise.”), and Portash, 440 U.S. at 458 
(distinguishing Harris because there the defendant made 
no claim that his statements obtained in violation of 
Miranda were coerced or involuntary), with Harris, 401 
U.S. at 224 (admitting statement obtained in violation of 
Miranda for the purpose of impeachment where 
“[p]etitioner makes no claim that the statements made to 
the police were coerced or involuntary”). 
106 See Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 17 (2003) 
(denying habeas petition where “precedent from [the 
Supreme] Court is, at best, ambiguous”). 
107 Rosen Br. 31-32 (arguing that testimony a defendant is 
compelled to give to the government’s expert is admissible 
only for the limited purpose of rebutting a psychological 
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yet “clearly established.” Rosen’s credible argument about 
where the Supreme Court should draw the line between cases 
such as Harris and Portash does not satisfy the deferential 
standard under AEDPA.108 It is not enough that Rosen’s 
argument is persuasive; it must be required by law and the state 
court’s contrary decision must not just be incorrect, but 
unreasonable.109  
B. Because there is no clear Fifth Amendment 
violation, Rosen failed to demonstrate that he is 
entitled to relief under § 2254(d)(2). 
 Rosen also argues that he is entitled to relief under 28 
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) because the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court’s harmlessness analysis was based on “an unreasonable 
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented.”110 
 
defense and therefore inadmissible once that defense is 
abandoned, even for garden variety impeachment); see 
also Gibbs, 387 F.3d at 274 (explaining that the Fifth 
Amendment waiver triggered by a mental health defense 
“is not limitless; it only allows the prosecution to use the 
interview to provide rebuttal to the psychiatric defense”).  
108 Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006) (holding that 
a state court’s decision is not contrary to or an 
unreasonable application of federal law where there is no 
Supreme Court holding that would require a different 
outcome). 
109 Matteo, 171 F.3d at 888 (“[I]t is not sufficient . . . to 
show merely that [petitioner’s] interpretation of Supreme 
Court precedent is more plausible than the state court’s; 
rather, the petitioner must demonstrate that Supreme Court 
precedent requires the contrary outcome. This standard 
precludes granting habeas relief solely on the basis of 
simple disagreement with a reasonable state court 
interpretation of the applicable precedent.”); see also 
Williams, 529 U.S. at 411 (“[A] federal habeas court may 
not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its 
independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision 
applied clearly established federal law erroneously or 
incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be 
unreasonable.”).  
110 This claim was not raised in the District Court and we 
could therefore deem the argument waived. See Nelson v. 
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Rosen argues that the court improperly conflated the testimony 
given to Dr. Fink with that given to Dr. Michals in concluding 
that “the same admissions could have been established by 
either expert’s testimony[.]”111 Based on that conclusion, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that since Dr. Fink’s 
testimony was indisputably admissible, “there is no reasonable 
possibility that the error may have contributed to the 
verdict.”112 However, Rosen is correct that there are significant 
discrepancies between the statements that he gave to the two 
experts. In fact, Dr. Michals testified to these discrepancies 
during Rosen’s first trial in order to suggest that Rosen was 
self-serving and challenge Rosen’s inconsistent version of 
events.113 It is therefore unlikely that, if Rosen had testified, 
“all of the impeachment evidence could have been elicited 
solely from Dr. Fink, who was in possession of the same 
mental health records and reports that Dr. Michals 
possessed.”114  
 
 Nevertheless, Rosen’s challenge to the harmlessness 
analysis is predicated on a finding that there was indeed a Fifth 
Amendment violation. Consequently, rebutting the state 
court’s harmlessness analysis is a necessary but not sufficient 
basis for relief. As we discussed above, we cannot conclude 
that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision violated 
Rosen’s clearly established Fifth Amendment rights. We 
therefore need not delve into whether any such hypothetical 
error was prejudicial to Rosen at trial.  
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
Adams USA, Inc., 529 U.S. 460, 469 (2000) (noting that 
“[i]t is indeed the general rule that issues must be raised in 
lower courts in order to be preserved as potential grounds 
of decision in higher courts”); Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 
106, 120 (1976) (noting that “[i]t is the general rule . . . 
that a federal appellate court does not consider an issue not 
passed upon below”). However, we can within our 
discretion choose to take up the issue on appeal and will do 
so briefly to dismiss the claim on the merits. Id. at 121. 
111 Rosen, 42 A.3d at 998. 
112 Id. 
113 A149-50; Rosen Br. 35-40. 
114 Rosen, 42 A.3d at 997. 
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For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s denial of the petition for habeas corpus.  
